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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Hadden argued that the district court erred when it
summarily dismissed three of the claims set forth in her petition for post-conviction relief
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in two separate criminal cases. One of the
claims was that her attorney in her attempted murder case was ineffective for failing to
request a continuance when she told him, prior to the sentencing hearing, that she was
under the influence of a psychotropic medication that caused her to feel "drugged" and
"very lethargic and foggy in [her] thinking."
In its Respondent's Brief, the State responds to each of the three claims.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-10.)

With respect to her claim concerning her attorney's

failure to seek a continuance of her sentencing hearing until she was no longer under
the influence of a psychotropic medication, the State argues, inter alia, that Ms. Hadden
"has failed to show that her factual allegation ... rendered her incompetent to proceed"
and that she has not "cited to any legal standard for a continuance that would have
been met by such a factual claim." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to respond to the State's arguments concerning the
sentencing hearing claim. While Ms. Hadden maintains that this Court should grant her
relief with respect to the other two claims, she need not respond to the State's
arguments concerning those claims, and instead relies on the arguments set forth in her
Appellant's Brief.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Hadden's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference.

2

ISSUE
Did Ms. Hadden's claim that her attorney was ineffective for failing to move for a
continuance of her sentencing hearing upon being informed that she was under the
influence of a psychotropic drug raise a genuine issue of material fact, necessitating an
evidentiary hearing?

3

ARGUMENT
Ms. Hadden's Claim That Her Attorney Was Ineffective For Failing To Move For A
Continuance Of Her Sentencing Hearing Upon Being Informed That She Was Under
The Influence Of A Psychotropic Drug Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact,
Necessitating An Evidentiary Hearing
In responding to Ms. Hadden's claim that she received ineffective assistance of
counsel when her attorney, knowing that she was under the influence of a psychotropic
drug at the time of her sentencing hearing, failed to move for a continuance of the
hearing until she was competent to proceed, the State submits the following argument:
A defendant is competent to proceed to sentencing if she has the "present
ability to consult with [her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding" and has a "rational, as well as factual, understanding of
the proceedings against [her]." State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314, _, 271
P.3d 712, 723 (2012) (quotations omitted). Hadden has failed to show
that her factual allegation that "Efexor" made her "very lethargic and foggy
in [her] thinking" (R., vol. II, p. 247) rendered her incompetent to proceed.
Nor has she cited to any legal standard for a continuance that would have
been met by such a factual claim. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-9 (citing no legal
standard for granting a motion for a continuance of a sentencing hearing).)
Hadden has failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that this
allegation fails to state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
because no motion to continue on the basis asserted by Hadden would
have been granted and no prejudice from the lack of delay has been
alleged.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8 (brackets in original).)
The

State's

argument

fails

because

it

stems

from

a

fundamental

misunderstanding of the standard to be employed by a district court in determining
whether to order summary dismissal of a post-conviction claim. It further fails because
Ms. Hadden did establish that, by law, she could not have been sentenced when she
was incompetent to proceed, therefore rendering the State's argument concerning a
failure to cite to "any legal standard for a continuance" in such a circumstance
unpersuasive. Finally, the State's claim that the district court's conclusion that it would

4

not have granted a continuance of the sentencing hearing demonstrates that
Ms. Hadden failed to make a prima facie showing to satisfy prejudice prong set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), also fails.
Ms. Hadden notes that the standard to be applied when deciding whether
summary dismissal of a post-conviction claim is appropriate was correctly set forth in
her Appellant's Brief as follows: "on review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief
application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court determines whether a genuine
issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with
any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party." (Appellant's Brief, p.6 (citing Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho
900, 903 (2007) (citations omitted)).)
In light of this standard, Ms. Hadden notes that she submitted uncontested
evidence that, at the time of her sentencing hearing, she was under the influence of a
psychotropic drug prescribed to her following a recent "mental breakdown," which
caused her to feel "very lethargic and foggy in [her] thinking," as a result of which she
was "not thinking very clearly" during her sentencing hearing. She also established that
she told her lawyer about the effects of the drug prior to the hearing, and her lawyer told
her "not to worry about it" because "this was a sentencing hearing and it didn't make a
difference."

(R., p.247.)

Furthermore, she presented passages from the sentencing

hearing showing that she made no attempt to correct a statement erroneously attributed
to her in the psychological evaluation and sat silently while the district court cited to that
misstatement while pronouncing sentence, and argued that it could be reasonably
inferred from her failure to object to the misstatement that she was not able to

5

participate meaningfully in her sentencing hearing as a result of her drugged condition.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11.) These uncontroverted facts and inferences, when taken in
the light most favorable to Ms. Hadden, the non-moving party, established a genuine
issue of material fact such that she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claim.
With respect to the State's argument that Ms. Hadden's claim should fail because
she did not cite "to any legal standard for a continuance that would have been met by
such a factual claim," she notes that she cited to both Idaho Code § 18-210, which
provides, "No person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried,
convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense so long as such
incapacity endures," I.C. § 18-210 (emphasis added), and State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho
53 (2003), in support of the proposition that conducting a sentencing hearing with a
defendant who is incapable of understanding and meaningfully participating in such a
hearing is improper. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.)
With respect to the State's argument that Ms. Hadden failed to establish that she
was prejudiced by any deficient performance because the district court indicated that it
would not have granted a continuance on the facts alleged, 1 she notes that this is not

1

What the district court actually concluded was that "[tJo prevail it would be the burden
of the defendant to prove that if the motion had been pursued it would have been
granted." (R., p.267 (citing Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622 (2010)).)
The actual standard announced in Schoger was whether the petitioner has
shown "a reasonable probability that but for her attorney's deficient performance the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different." Schoger, 148 Idaho at 624
(emphasis added). The holding in Schoger is consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Strickland that, in order to prevail on the prejudice prong,
the petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). The Strickland court also explained that
6

the standard to apply when assessing Strickland's prejudice prong. Rather, the Court in
Strickland explained that a trial judge's testimony as to what he or she would have done

absent the deficient performance "is irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 700. Therefore, the State's claim that the district court concluded that it would
not have granted a continuance even if it had known of Ms. Hadden's drugged
condition, is not relevant to a consideration of the prejudice prong and must fail.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and in her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Hadden
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment of dismissal as
to the three claims contained in her Appellant's Brief, and remand this matter to the
district court for an evidentiary hearing on those claims.
DATED this 20 th day of November, 2012.

SPENCERJ.HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered
the outcome of the case." Id. at 693.
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